SHA-256: 54077a5b15638e354fa02318623775b7a1cc0e8c21e59bcbab333035369e377f
Analysis Date: 2026-04-08
Related Research: EXPMON Blog - Zero-Day Adobe Reader Exploit
VirusTotal: VT Report
| POST / HTTP/1.1 | |
| Host: localhost | |
| User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 | |
| Next-Action: x | |
| Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryx8jO2oVc6SWP3Sad | |
| Content-Length: 459 | |
| ------WebKitFormBoundaryx8jO2oVc6SWP3Sad | |
| Content-Disposition: form-data; name="0" |
| XZ Backdoor symbol deobfuscation. Updated as i make progress |
| blocked_ips | from | to | published_at | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | 02-02-2024 | 02-04-2024 | 07-02-2024 | |
| 1 | 05-02-2024 | 07-02-2024 | 13-02-2024 | |
| 2 | 09-02-2024 | 09-02-2024 | 15-02-2024 | |
| 410 | 10-02-2024 | 10-02-2024 | 15-02-2024 | |
| 67 | 11-02-2024 | 11-02-2024 | 15-02-2024 | |
| 40 | 12-02-2024 | 12-02-2024 | 15-02-2024 | |
| 34 | 14-02-2024 | 14-02-2024 | 16-02-2024 | |
| 99 | 15-02-2024 | 15-02-2024 | 16-02-2024 | |
| 142 | 16-02-2024 | 16-02-2024 | 21-02-2024 |
| #!/bin/bash | |
| # This script resolves a DID, retrieves an API key, fetches a user's feed, | |
| # and posts a "Hello, world" message to the user's feed. | |
| # Resolve DID for handle | |
| HANDLE='felicitas.pojtinger.com' | |
| DID_URL="https://bsky.social/xrpc/com.atproto.identity.resolveHandle" | |
| export DID=$(curl -G \ | |
| --data-urlencode "handle=$HANDLE" \ |
MS Office docx files may contain external OLE Object references as HTML files. There is an HTML sceme "ms-msdt:" which invokes the msdt diagnostic tool, what is capable of executing arbitrary code (specified in parameters).
The result is a terrifying attack vector for getting RCE through opening malicious docx files (without using macros).
Here are the steps to build a Proof-of-Concept docx:
- Open Word (used up-to-date 2019 Pro, 16.0.10386.20017), create a dummy document, insert an (OLE) object (as a Bitmap Image), save it in docx.
This is src doc of my presentation on shibuya.xss #8 (2016-11-14)
The main topic is vulnerabilities related to url parser.
- PHP https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=73192
- Java/OpenJDK http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk8u/jdk8u/jdk/rev/cd0585378c46 (CVE-2016-5552)
- Android https://android.googlesource.com/platform/libcore/+/4b3f2c6c5b84f80fae8eeeb46727811e055715ea%5E%21/ (CVE-2016-5552)
WebWorks is a BlackBerry SDK that leverages Web technologies to create applications for BlackBerry 5.0, 6.0, and QNX. An application that is built with WebWorks uses HTML, CSS, and JavaScript and is called a Web widget. The structure of the application is similar to a thick-client JavaScript Web application, where JavaScript manages the model, view, and logic.
WebWorks enhances the JavaScript API to allow any Web widget application to access any Blackberry Java API. RIM includes a small WebWorks JavaScript API that allows access to some BlackBerry device features, such as invoking third-party applications. However, more importantly, WebWorks allows developers to create an Java extension that binds JavaScript and Java. This means any Java API can be accessible to JavaScript.
The WebWorks SDK uses a command-line tool called bbwp.exe (Windows-only) to create a BlackBerry-compatible application binary (.cod). Since a WebWorks application is pa